ABSTRACT The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise unconditionally secure key exchanger is a promising, surprisingly simple, very low cost and efficient electronic alternative to quantum key distribution. A few resistors, switches, and interconnecting cables can provide unconditionally secure data transmission in the ideal case by utilizing the thermal noise of the resistors. The key problems regarding practical realizations are related to the resistance tolerance, finite cable resistance, and other non-ideal properties that can cause information leak. In this paper, we present robust protection from cable resistance and resistance mismatch attacks against the system. Our theoretical results show that all resistive inaccuracies, parasitic resistances, cable resistance, and temperature dependence can be compensated; therefore, the practical implementation becomes much easier. The generalized method provides inherent protection against the so-called second law attack as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure data transmission is without doubt among the most challenging problems today. Millions of sensitive data transfer transactions are performed in every second in various fields of economy, medicine, traffic, industry, governmental and military activities and even more. One of the most known and hopeful tool to realize unconditionally secure communication could be the quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] . However, it requires rather special and expensive hardware, electronic-to-optical signal conversion, special optical data paths. Therefore, there is a natural need for much cheaper and much less difficult alternatives that can effectively replace QKD in wide variety of high-volume practical applications. One of these is an exceptionally simple and ultralow-cost alternative based on classical physics has been introduced that can have unbeatable advantages [2] - [6] . The so-called Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme (also known as Kish Key Distribution (KKD) [7] ) is an electronic system that uses only a four resistors and two switches to share a secret key fully securely. The simplest version of the KLJN system can be seen in Fig. 1 .
Both communicating parties, Alice and Bob, can choose one of the two resistors to be connected to the communication line, R L or R H . There are four possible states depending on the choice of Alice and Bob: LL, LH, HL and HH. The thermal (Johnson) noise voltage of the selected resistor is the signal source at each end and has the effective power spectral density of 4kTR L or 4kTR H depending on the state of the corresponding switch, k is the Boltzmann constant, and T is the absolute temperature. The eavesdropper Eve can observe the resulting noise voltage V E and noise current I E in the interconnecting wire. From the eavesdropper's point of view, the two resistors are connected in parallel, therefore the power spectral density of the voltage noise is 4kTR L R H /(R L + R H ), if different resistors are chosen at the two sides. In this case the current noise power spectral density is given by and 4kT/(R L + R H ). Therefore, one can see that the LH and HL states can't be distinguished by the eavesdropper, while both Alice and Bob has the information where the lower and higher value resistors are. This can be used to exchange a single bit of information with unconditional security. There is a fundamental thermodynamical explanation of this feature: if the system is in thermal equilibrium, there is no energy FIGURE 1. Two equivalent models of the KLJN key exchanger. At both ends lower (L) and higher (H) value resistors can be chosen using the switches. At the bottom the separate voltage generators represent the thermal noise of the corresponding resistors. The eavesdropper can measure the voltage V E and current I E in the cable and knows the values of R L and R H that are public. LH state is shown; HL state can be selected by toggling both switches.
flow between the two parties, therefore there is no way to extract information, the dynamics of the system if fully symmetric [2] . This also implies that the correlation between the voltage V E and current I E is zero. It is important to note that Alice, Bob and Eve must evaluate the power spectral density, therefore a certain averaging time is needed called bit transfer time. Assuming a given bandwidth, the variance is proportional to the power spectral density therefore the evaluation of this is preferred in practical applications. The instant values are meaningless due to the random nature of the signals. All system parameters are public including the values of R L and R H . DC or other deterministic voltage generators can't be used for secure communication.
This very smart and incredibly simple idea can be implemented in practice with the use of some additional electronic components [8] and can even be integrated on a chip easily that allows application in many modern compact electronic devices. Secret key exchange between integrated circuits on a printed circuit board, between machines in a hospital, between computers located in different buildings are all supported. Since the thermal noise amplitude is very small, artificial voltage generators typically based on digital-to-analog converters (DAC) can be used to set the voltage noise effective amplitude to the desired value [8] , [9] . The effective power of the thermal noise voltage signal with bandwidth of f BW is equal to 4kTRf BW , therefore the amplitude tuning can be considered as emulating different, typically very high temperatures. The system has inspired the development of a discrete time secure key exchanger [10] also. Many different kinds of attack types have been discussed: attacks based on cable resistance [4] , [11] - [14] , temperature difference in the channel [15] , [16] , finite propagation time [11] , Bennett-Riedel attack [17] , [18] , directional coupler attack [7] , [19] , [20] , second law attack [14] , transient attack [21] , and current injection attack [22] . The system is still claimed to be unconditionally secure in its ideal operating conditions [2] , [3] . The phrase unconditional security is used in many papers about the KLJN key exchange scheme, the most detailed discussion can be found in [3] , while different interpretation recently considered [21] . It is important to note that in a physical realization there is always an information leak that depends on many factors like cable length, resistance tolerance, noise bandwidth, parasitic capacitance, propagation time. However, with proper design, the information leak can be reduced to arbitrarily small level [3] , [9] and, unlike in the case of conditionally secure systems, no additional restrictions are assumed on the measurement precision or computational resources available to the eavesdropper.
Many possible applications are considered including securing computer communications, hardware components, memories, processors, keyboards, mass storage devices, key distribution over the Smart Grid, ethernet cables, uncloneable hardware keys, industrial sensor networks and automotive communication [23] - [28] .
The original KJLN system discussed above uses two identical resistor pairs, two switches and interconnecting cable to transfer data securely. The thermal noise of the resistors is used to hide information from the eavesdropper, while the communicating parties, Alice and Bob, can measure the noise magnitude to determine the state of the system and this way they can exchange bits of a key. Recently we have applied a different approach to guarantee unconditional security and this allowed a significant generalization of the system [29] . We have shown that it is not required to have the same lower and higher value resistors at the two ends. Our main point was that all quantities measured by the eavesdropper must be the same for the LH and HL states. This means that thermal equilibrium and zero correlation of the voltage and current fluctuations are not needed any more what was a critical point of the original arrangement to prove security and in the same time it exposed the system to rather strong attacks [14] . This generalization has already inspired new exchange schemes also [30] .
In the generalized KLJN system depicted in Fig. 2 at both ends of the communication line lower (L) and higher (H) value resistors can be chosen again, but there are no other restrictions on the values of the resistors. It has been shown that the eavesdropper cannot distinguish between the states LH and HL if the voltage noise amplitudes are properly chosen [29] . In other words, if the resistor values are given, it is possible to find voltage noise amplitudes that guarantee FIGURE 2. The generalized KLJN key exchanger with finite cable resistance. At both ends lower (L) and higher (H) value resistors can be chosen using the switches. The voltage generators represent the thermal noise of the corresponding resistor. The eavesdropper can measure the voltage V E and current I E anywhere in the cable that has resistance R C . The observation point is indicated by q in the range of 0 to 1. LH state is shown; HL state can be selected by toggling both switches.
unconditional security. It is important to note that since in the generalized case any value for the resistors can be used, all resistor inaccuracies and parasitic resistances including the resistance of the switches can be taken into account rather easily. The voltage noise amplitudes can be tuned to fully eliminate the effect of these non-ideal components. This is a crucial feature concerning practical applications where such conditions always present. Although the application of artificial generators could allow the use of almost any kind of noise signal, we have proven that absolute security can be guaranteed if and only if Gaussian noise is used [29] , [31] .
In the following we consider a new, more practical case when the cable has finite resistance and the eavesdropper can measure the voltage and current anywhere in the cable.
II. RESULTS

A. GENERALIZED ATTACK PROTECTION
We prove that by proper tuning of the amplitude of the voltage noise generators can fully prevent information leak at any observation point of the cable. Instead of using thermodynamic approach [2] here we apply mathematical statistical tools following the methods used in our latest articles in the subject [29] , [31] , [32] .
The current I E and voltage V E observed by the eavesdropper in the LH state (shown in Fig. 2 ) can be written as:
Here q specifies the observation point in the cable; it is zero at the left end of the cable and unity at the other end.
Similar equations can be obtained for the HL state, when the higher values resistor is selected at Alice's side:
The communication can only be secure, if the eavesdropper observes the same statistical properties of these signals both for the LH and HL states. The variance of the current I E , the variance of the voltage V E and the correlation between these signals must not depend on the actual state. Using (1) and (3) the variance of the current can be calculated for the two states, LH and HL, and these must be equal:
The following equation that expresses the equality of the voltage variances in the LH and HL states can be obtained using (2) and (4):
Finally, the correlation of the current and voltage must be the same in the LH and HL cases:
Since all voltage noise signals are independent, the cross correlation terms, V HB (t) · V LA (t) , and V HA (t) · V LB (t) , are zero. Therefore, the left hand side of (7) can be written as
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One can similarly simplify the right term of (7) to the following:
Using (7), (8) and (9) we get
According to (5), (6) and (10) the variances of the voltage noise signals at Alice and Bob must satisfy the following equations (11)- (13), as shown at the bottom of this page.
The variance of V LA (t) can be selected without restrictions that allows optimization of the signal amplitudes in real applications. We can conclude that properly chosen values of the voltage generators can be used to ensure security, therefore the information leak caused by the cable resistance can be fully eliminated even for the generalized KLJN system, when all four resistor values can have independent values. It is important to note that (11), (12) and (13) do not contain q, which means that the security is maintained over the full length of the interconnecting cable. The eavesdropper cannot determine the state of the system; it doesn't matter where the actual observation point is. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show examples for the dependence of the correlation between the voltage and current measured by the eavesdropper on the observation position q for different resistor values and cable resistance. The key point is that although the correlation does depend of the value of q, on the cable resistance and on the value of the resistors used in the system, it is the same for both the LH and HL cases. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the most common schematic used in the articles about the KLJN system. However, the communicating parties can be far from each other, papers discussed cable lengths from a few meters to hundreds of kilometers [8] , [33] . In addition, the cable resistance can matter in the case of shorter distance depending on the value of the resistors used in the system. For example, in the case of the communication (11), (12) and (13).
B. FINITE GROUND IMPEDANCE
FIGURE 4.
Correlation of the voltage V E and current I E as a function of the observation position q. Note that the correlation is the same for both the LH and HL states. In this example the following values were used in (10): R HA = 9 kOhm, R LB = 3 kOhm, R LA = 1 kOhm, R HB = 9 kOhm, V LA = 1 V. The used values of R C are indicated in the figure and V HB , V LB and V HA were calculated using (11), (12) and (13) .
between microcontrollers in a vehicle the wire resistance can be considerable. In such cases one can't assume zero impedance grounding, therefore a more practical version can be taken into account as shown in Fig. 5 . Here both interconnecting wires have their own finite resistance and we assume that the eavesdropper can measure the voltage between any two points of these wires. The two wires can have similar or rather different resistance, examples can be two parallel wires and a coaxial cable. Note that a distributed RLC network analysis for high frequency signals not considered here can be found in [33] .
1144 VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 5. A more practical view of the generalized KLJN key exchanger with finite cable resistance that is relevant for communication between distant parties. In this case both interconnecting wires of the loop have finite resistance, no grounding with zero impedance is assumed.
Our theoretical treatment presented above is valid for this case, we only need to express the cable resistance R C and the value of q. The same loop resistance is obtained when
while V E is equivalent if
C. SPECIAL CASE, THE ORIGINAL KLJN SYSTEM
The original KLJN system can be treated as a special case, when the lower and higher value resistors are the same at the two ends: R LA = R LB = R L and R HA = R HB = R H . Using this condition in (11), (12) and (13) one can obtain the voltage noise variances required for secure communication:
Note that the lower and higher voltage variances are the same at both ends just like the associated resistors, regardless of the value of the cable resistance R c . According to (16) and (17) one can see that the voltage variance must be proportional to the corresponding resistor value plus the half of the cable resistance -just as if the original system with zero resistance cable would have such resistors and the eavesdropper would listen in the middle (q = 0.5). Therefore, in this case the correlation between V E and I E is zero.
When q is different from 0.5 -i.e. the eavesdropper does not acquire voltage and current in the middle point -then the correlation between V E and I E is not zero, see Fig. 6 .
Consequently, for non-zero cable resistance zero correlation between the voltage and current can't be required, since it can be satisfied in the middle of the cable only. On the other hand, as we have proven, the correlation is the same in the LH and HL states regardless of the value of q; therefore, the unconditional security is still provided over the full extent of the cable.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have investigated the security of the KLJN secure key exchange system in its most general operating condition so far. In the original system the communicating resistor pairs must be identical at the two ends. Any deviation from this due to for example resistor inaccuracy or finite switch on-resistance causes information leak and exposes the system to attacks. Our theoretical results show that unconditional security can be maintained over the full extent of the communication line for any kind of interconnecting cables or wires and when all four resistors values can be different. In our generalized case the thermal equilibrium is not needed any more, therefore the so called second law attack [14] is inherently prevented. Note that a new version of the KLJN key exchange scheme [30] inspired by our generalization [29] is also protected against general attacks by the use of random resistors and random temperature. One of the most important advantages of the generalized system discussed in this paper is that resistance tolerance, parasitic resistance of the switches, voltage generator source resistance and the cable resistance can all be compensated. Fig. 7 shows a simplified schematic of a possible real communicator module that utilizes a voltage output DAC to realize the artificial voltage noise generator.
Here R G represents the output resistance of the voltage output DAC, dR L and dR H are the deviations from the ideal R L and R H communicator resistance values and R SWL and R SWH are the switch on resistance values in the L and H states, respectively. This means that the equivalent lower value resistance is
and the equivalent higher value resistance can be expressed as R H ,eq = R H + dR H + R G + R SWH .
The equivalent values for both communicator modules can be used in (11) , (12) and (13) to determine the required noise amplitudes that guarantee secure communication. As shown in Fig. 7 a single DAC is enough to generate the noise signal for both the L and H states, because the voltage amplitude can be programmed accordingly. Note that between state transitions (LH→HL and HL→LH) the signal must be ramped down to zero to avoid sharp changes and associated transients that can expose the system to attacks [8] and the resolution, non-linearity, limited signal range of the DAC should be considered in practical applications.
During operation the loop current and voltages at different nodes can be measured without disturbing the communication process. This means that the resistance values can be monitored in real-time, therefore even continuous compensation is possible. The temperature dependence can be considered in industrial and automotive environments, where wide range of temperature can be expected. If the communicators are used in mobile devices and different cables may be used, the cable resistance can be changed and the system's parameters can be affected. In these cases, the level of security is limited by the accuracy of the resistance measurement and the voltage amplitude tuning only.
The results presented in this paper can help to make the real world application of the KLJN protocol a lot easier in many fields [23] - [28] . Our method is based on the use of mathematical statistical tools and we did not use the original thermodynamical physical approach. Further information including open source simulation software and demonstrational videos can be found on our institutional page [34] .
